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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade the US has experienced widening current account deficits and a steady
deterioration of its net foreign asset position. During the second half of the 1990s, this deterioration
was fueled by foreign investment in a booming US stock market. During the first half of the 2000s,
this deterioration has been fuelled by foreign purchases of rapidly increasing US government debt.
A somewhat surprising aspect of the current debate is that stock market movements and fiscal policy
choices  have  been  largely  treated  as  unrelated  events.  Stock  market  movements  are  usually
interpreted as reflecting exogenous changes in perceived or real productivity, while budget deficits
are usually understood as a mainly political decision. We challenge this view here and develop two
alternative interpretations. Both are based on the notion that a bubble the 'dot-com' bubble) has been
driving the stock market, but differ in their assumptions about the interactions between this bubble
and fiscal policy (the 'Bush' deficits). The 'benevolent' view holds that a change in investor sentiment
led to the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the Bush deficits were a welfare-improving policy
response to this event. The 'cynical' view holds instead that the Bush deficits led to the collapse of
the dot-com bubble as the new administration tried to appropriate rents from foreign investors. We
discuss the implications of each of these views for the future evolution of the US economy and, in
particular, its net foreign asset position.
Aart Kraay
The World Bank













Since the early 1990s the United States has experienced steadily 
widening current account deficits, reaching 5.7 percent of GNP in 2004 (see top 
panel of Figure 1). These deficits are large relative to the post-war US historical 
experience. With the exception of a brief period in the mid-1980s where current 
account deficits reached 3.3 percent of GNP, the US current account has 
typically registered small surpluses or deficits averaging around one percent of 
GNP. As a consequence of the recent deficits, the US net foreign asset position 
has declined sharply from –5 percent of GNP in 1995 to about –26 percent by 
the end of 2004 (see bottom panel of Figure 1). The goal of this paper is to 
provide an account of this decline that relates it to other major macroeconomic 
events and helps us to grasp its implications for welfare and policy. 
 
Any attempt to do this must take into consideration a major change in the 
pattern of asset trade between the US and the rest of the world (see Figure 2). 
During the second half of the 1990s, the US accumulated foreign assets and 
liabilities at the rate of $765 billion and $965 billion per year. About two-thirds of 
this consisted of increases in the volume and value of equity holdings. This 
pattern reversed sharply in the first half of the 2000s. The worldwide collapse in 
equity prices erased a substantial fraction of the assets and liabilities that the US 
had accumulated during the 1990s, resulting in an increase of US net holdings of 
equity of about $232 billion per year. Despite this, the US net foreign asset 
position declined at the rate of $296 billion per year as US net holdings of debt 
(both public and private) declined at the rate of $528 billion per year. While in the 
second half of the 1990s most of the changes in US foreign assets and liabilities 
were driven by equity, in the first half of the 2000s these changes were mainly 
driven by debt. 
 
This change in the composition of the US current account deficit is a 
natural reflection of the two major macroeconomic events of this period. The first 
one is the “dot-com” bubble of the 1990s.  Between 1990 and the peak in mid-
2000, US equity prices increased nearly five-fold, and the growth rate of equity  3
prices accelerated from 10.4 percent per year between 1990 and 1995, to 21.2 
percent per year between 1995 and 2000 (see top panel of Figure 3).  The value 
of US stock market capitalization grew even faster, doubling between 1990 and 
1995, and then tripling between 1995 and the peak in 2000 (see bottom panel of 
Figure 3). The stock market boom in the rest of the world was less spectacular, 
but still quite impressive by historical standards. Equity prices in the major 
foreign markets grew 7.9 percent per year during the second half of the 1990s. 
As is well known, this episode ended with a sharp downward adjustment that 
started in 2000. By 2003 equity prices in the US and abroad had fallen by 30 
percent, and stock market capitalization had fallen by about 25 percent.  Since 
these changes in equity prices have taken place against a background of 
relatively low interest rates and low inflation, being in the stock market surely 
was a good idea in the second half of the 1990s but a lousy one in the first half 
of the 2000s.   
 
The second major macroeconomic event was the reemergence of large 
fiscal deficits in the United States after the Bush administration took over in 2000 
(see Figure 4). Unlike the 1980s, the 1990s were a period of declining budget 
deficits and small surpluses. After 2000 budget deficits reappeared with a 
vengeance however, reaching 4.8 percent of GNP in 2004. As a result, US 
public debt has increased sharply from 33 to 37 percent of GNP between 2001 
and 2004.  An intriguing feature of this recent period is that large budget deficits 
have not been accompanied by any significant increase in the cost of borrowing 
for the federal government (see Figure 4). Roughly speaking, the 1970s were 
characterized by low budget deficits and low interest rates, while the period 
1980-95 featured high budget deficits and high interest rates. But over the past 
10 years this pattern has unraveled, with fairly high interest rates and low deficits 
during the second half of the 1990s, followed by low interest rates and large 
budget deficits since 2000. 
 
  What are the links between the dot-com bubble, the Bush deficits, and 
the US current account? As a first attack to this question, we develop in Sections 
one and two a conventional macroeconomic that crudely, but effectively, 
encapsulates conventional views of the US current account deficit. According to  4
these views, its appearance in the second half of the 1990s reflected an 
increase in US productivity relative to the rest of the world that led investors all 
over the world to place their savings in the US stock market. The situation 
reversed and US productivity declined in 2000, leading to the stock market 
collapse. But the current account deficit continued despite this, now fueled by a 
the drastic change in fiscal policy implemented by the Bush administration. This 
change is usually attributed to purely exogenous factors such as the cost of the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a desire to cut taxes.  This policy is 
however unsustainable and something must eventually give. Most observers 
think that this episode will end with a painful fiscal adjustment, although there 
are also those who argue that the resolution will entail some default on the part 
of the US government.
1 
 
  This view has two major problems when confronting the data however. 
The first one is inability to explain observed movements in the stock market. If 
the latter only contains productive firms, its value should reflect that of the capital 
held by these firms. Since capital is reproducible, its price cannot exceed the 
cost of producing additional units. Therefore, increases in the value of the stock 
market must either reflect increases in the cost or the quantity of capital owned 
by US firms.  But it is hard to find evidence of increases in either of these 
variables that would justify the more than three-fold increase in US stock market 
capitalization that occurred during the second half of the 1990s. And it is even 
harder to find evidence that would justify a one-quarter decline in the first few 
years of the 2000s. The second problem relates to the behavior of interest rates. 
The model predicts that the US fiscal expansion should increase the interest rate 
as government debt crowds out capital from the portfolios of investors. But the 
evidence shows exactly the opposite. The real interest rate fell from above three 
percent in the second half of the 1990s to almost zero percent in the early 
2000s. 
 
                                                
1 Few would argue that the US government will fail to make stipulated payments, but still 
some think that there is some probability that the US government effectively defaults on 
its obligations by engineering a high and unexpected inflation that reduces the real value 
of these payments.  5
What has been driving the stock market during the last decade? Why did 
the interest rate fall in the midst of one of the largest fiscal expansions in US 
history?  We argue in Section three that the conventional model is ill-equipped to 
handle these questions, because it assumes that financial markets work 
relatively well and all savings are channeled into efficient investments. If financial 
markets do not work as well, the economy might contain pockets of inefficient 
investments that deliver a rate of return that is below the growth rate of the 
economy. These investments are inefficient since they absorb on average more 
resources than they produce.
2  It is well-known that in this situation both stock 
market bubbles and government debt can play the useful role of displacing 
inefficient investments, raising the interest rate and hence the consumption and 
welfare of all.  Moreover, those who create the bubbles and/or issue the debt 
receive rents that can be interpreted as a fee for providing this service.
3  A 
crucial and novel aspect of the model presented here is that it provides a formal 
description of how bubbles and debt interact with each other as they compete for 
a fixed pool of savings. 
 
In Sections four and five we show that these interactions provide a new 
perspective on recent macroeconomic events.  In Section four we construct an 
equilibrium in which the stock market initially creates a bubble that eliminates 
inefficient investments. The world economy operates efficiently and the interest 
rate and welfare are both high. But a change in investor sentiment triggers the 
collapse of the bubble, so that inefficient investments reappear and the interest 
rate declines. The government reacts to this by running large budget deficits and 
expanding public debt sufficiently to crowd out these inefficient investments.  
According to this “benevolent” view, the Bush deficits constitute a welfare-
improving policy response to the collapse of the dot-com bubble. 
                                                
2 The resources devoted to keep these investments are roughly equal to the growth rate 
times the capital stock. The resources obtained from such investments are roughly equal 
to the rate of return times the capital stock. If the growth rate exceeds the rate of return, 
the economy obtains additional resources by eliminating these inefficient investments. 
See Abel et al. [1989]. 
3 The paper that discovered dynamic inefficiency is Samuelson [1958]. See also Shell 
[1971] for a revealing discussion of this problem. For the analysis of government debt, 
see Diamond [1965], Woodford [1990] and Hellwig and Lorenzoni [2003]. For the 
analysis of stock market bubbles, see Tirole [1985], Grossman and Yanagawa [1993], 
King and Ferguson [1993], Olivier [2000], Ventura [2002, 2003].  6
 
Section five constructs an alternative equilibrium which again begins with 
the stock market creating a bubble that eliminates inefficient investments. The 
government initially refrains from running budget deficits and this creates space 
for the bubble to grow. But there is a change in government that leads to a 
drastic change in fiscal policy. The new government wants to collect as much 
revenue as possible and starts a fiscal expansion that crowds out the bubble. 
This policy implements a transfer from the owners of the bubble at home and 
abroad to the US government.  In this “cynical” view, the Bush deficits constitute 
a “beggar-thy-neighbour” policy that is responsible for the collapse of the dot-
com bubble. 
 
Interestingly, the “benevolent” and cynical” views are observationally 
equivalent. In both of them, the collapse of the bubble is accompanied by a 
decline in the interest rate and a large fiscal expansion that leads to a high but 
stable level of debt. In both views, this high level of debt is compatible with the 
US running budget deficits forever (although smaller than the current ones). In 
both of them, the US net foreign asset position can remain negative forever. In 
both views, the collapse of the bubble generates a loss for shareholders at home 
and abroad and a windfall for the US government. The only difference between 
the two views lies in the shock that caused this chain of events. While in the 
“benevolent” view this shock is a change in investor sentiment, in the “cynical” 
view this shock is a change in government policy. 
 
  Of course, this is not the first paper to be written on the US current 
account deficit. A substantial literature in the past few years has studied the 
determinants and sustainability of the US current account deficit. Much of this 
literature has adopted what we have termed as “conventional” views without 
much discussion, and has instead focused on determining its implications. Most 
notably, Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000, 2004, and 2005], Blanchard, Giavazzi and 
Sa [2005], and Roubini and Setser [2004] have all argued a large current  7
account reversal is inevitable and will likely be accompanied by a large and 
disruptive depreciation in the dollar.
4   
 
The two papers that are perhaps closer to this one are Ventura [2001] 
and Caballero, Farhi and Hammour [2005].  Both of these papers challenge 
“conventional” views and stress instead the effects of an expectations-driven 
stock market bubble on the US net foreign asset position.  Ventura emphasized 
the role of the dot-com bubble as the main driver of the current account deficits 
during the second half of the 1990s, and argued that those deficits would be 
sustainable in the absence of a bubble collapse. Unlike this paper, Ventura did 
not offer a formal model connecting stock market bubbles and the net foreign 
asset position, nor did he analyze the potential interactions between bubbles and 
fiscal deficits.  Caballero et al. study a one-country model in which high 
expectations about the future create sufficient savings to fund the investment 
necessary to validate these expectations. In contrast, we work with a world 
equilibrium model in which there is a fixed pool of world savings and the stock 
market bubble, capital, and public debt compete for it. While Caballero et al. 
place the savings decision and adjustment costs in investment at center stage of 




1. A model of crowding-out with debt and capital 
 
  This section presents a stylized model of productivity, debt and deficits. It 
depicts a world where young individuals save to provide for their old age 
consumption. These savings are used to finance both productive investments 
and government deficits. Fiscal policy is used to redistribute consumption across 
different generations. In particular, deficits finance additional present 
                                                
4 We do not analyze the implications of our scenarios for the real exchange rate, 
although it would be straightforward to do it. The results would also be straightforward 
and standard. The real exchange rate would move in opposite direction to the current 
account and the magnitude of the change would depend on the usual parameters, i.e. 
the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods and the elasticity of 
substitution between traded goods produced at home and abroad.  8
consumption by crowding-out productive investments and lowering future 
consumption. This model constitutes a useful starting point for our argument, 
since it neatly encapsulates conventional views on the effects and the 
sustainability of fiscal deficits. 
 
Consider a world with two regions: US and ROW. This world is populated 
by overlapping generations of young and old. Each generation contains a 
continuum of members with aggregate size one that are evenly distributed 
across the two regions. Let I and I* be the sets of US and ROW residents, 
respectively. As usual, use an asterisk to denote ROW variables and omit the 
asterisk to denote US variables. There is a single good that can be used for 
consumption and investment. Each generation receives an endowment of this 
good during youth, which is evenly distributed among all its members. The 
endowment grows from one generation to the next at a (gross) rate γ . We 
normalize units so that the endowment of generation t is equal to γ
t, and we 
express all quantity variables as a share of this endowment. 
 
The young are patient and risk-neutral, and they maximize expected old 
age consumption. Given this objective, the young save all their income and the 
old consume all of theirs. Since the income of the young consists only of the 
endowment mentioned above, our normalization implies that all the quantity 
variables are to be interpreted as a share of world savings.  The income of the 
old consists of the return to their savings plus a transfer from the government 
which could be positive or negative. We shall assume throughout that this 
transfer is independent of an individual’s actions. Therefore, the only important 
decision in any individual’s life is how to invest his/her savings so as to maximize 
its expected return. This portfolio choice is at the heart of the story we want to 
tell here. 
 
The menu of investment options available to the young consists of 
government debt and firms. Government debt consists of one-period bonds. We 
assume that fiscal policies are consistent in the sense that, if the market decided 
not to roll over the debt, the government would be able (and willing) to generate  9
enough of a surplus so as to redeem all the bonds issued. This ensures that 
debt payments are made with probability one. It also implies that debt issued by 
US and ROW governments must offer the same interest rate. Let rt+1 be this 
common (gross) interest rate for holding government debt from date t to date 
t+1. 
 
Firms are investment projects run by entrepreneurs. A fraction κ t of these 
projects is located in the US (although some of these projects might be managed 
by ROW entrepreneurs). We assume that this share can vary stochastically over 
time within the unit interval. Firms purchase capital during the entrepreneur’s 
youth, produce during the entrepreneur’s old age and then distribute a single 
dividend per unit of capital before breaking up. This dividend or production is 
random and has a mean π . To finance the purchase of capital, firms can use 
private or internal funds (i.e. the entrepreneur’s own savings) or they can go 
public and raise external funds in the stock market (i.e. the savings of young 
other than the entrepreneur). Firms that are financed by internal funds offer an 
expected gross return equal to π . Firms that are financed by external funds are 
subject to agency costs equal to α  and offer an expected gross return π -α .
5 
Therefore, investing in self-financed firms is preferred to holding stocks of traded 
firms.  
 
Throughout the paper, we assume that the economy is sufficiently 
productive, i.e. π >γ . This ensures that the expected return to capital exceeds the 
growth rate of savings. For the next couple of sections, we further assume that 
agency costs are not too severe, i.e. α <π -γ . This is equivalent to saying that 
financial frictions are small and the stock market is close enough to the 
frictionless paradigm. This assumption turns out to be crucial and will be 
removed in Section three. 
 
                                                
5 Agency costs arise from incentive problems that are created by the separation between 
ownership and control. One example is the cost of monitoring the manager to ensure 
that he/she does not embezzle funds from the firm. Another example is the efficiency 
loss due to less than optimal effort in situations where shareholders imperfectly observe 
the manager’s actions or information set.  10 
Each generation contains two types of young: “entrepreneurs” and 
“shareholders”. The former have good investment projects that they can convert 
into a firm, while the latter do not. For simplicity, assume both regions have the 
same distribution of types. It follows from our assumptions that entrepreneurs 
either invest in their own self-financed firms or buy government debt, while 
shareholders are forced to choose between holding stocks of publicly traded 
firms and government debt.
6 Therefore, we can write the expected consumption 











+ E i if T E } r , max{
E i if T E } r , max{
C E
1 t , i t 1 t
1 t , i t 1 t
1 t , i t  
 
where Ti,t+1 is the transfer that old individual i receives from its government
7 
(remember that all quantity variables are expressed as a share of the world 
endowment); while E is the set of entrepreneurs. We assume the measure of 
this set is ε . Unless rt+1≥π , entrepreneurs enjoy higher expected consumption 




Let Dt be total (US plus ROW) government debt, and let δ t be the fraction 
of this total that has been issued by the US. Then, we can write debt dynamics 
as follows: 
  
                                                
6 Who runs publicly traded firms? Remember each generation contains a continuum of 
individuals with aggregate income equal to γ
t. Assume each (“infinitesimal”) entrepreneur 
can run a (“non-infinitesimal”) firm of size υ . If this entrepreneur uses only internal funds, 
his/her expected utility is π⋅γ
t⋅ di. If this entrepreneur uses external funds, his/her 
expected utility is old age consumption is (π -α )⋅γ
t⋅ di+m; where m is the manager’s fee. 
Since there is free entry, the equilibrium manager’s fee is m=α⋅γ
t⋅ di. Since this fee is 
infinitesimal, it constitutes a negligible cost for a non-infinitesimal of size υ  and we can 
disregard it. Therefore, the model depicts a world where a “small” subset of 
entrepreneurs use external funds to build “large” firms that are traded in the stock 
market, while a “large” subset of entrepreneurs runs “small” firms using internal funds. 
7 We are assuming here that only the old receive transfers. 
8 This comparison holds both the transfer and the date of birth constant. Remember that 
expected consumption is measured as a share of the endowment and therefore welfare 
is given by γ
t⋅ EtCi,t+1. A shareholder of a future generation might enjoy more welfare than 
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Equation (2) shows that debt equals to debt payments plus the primary deficit. 
The latter is nothing but the sum of all the transfers received by the old. Equation 
(3) shows how the US share evolves, for given primary deficits of the two 
regions. We shall only consider sequences of deficits such that Dt≤ 1 in all dates 
and states of nature. This is equivalent to assuming that governments never 
default on their debts. This assumption will be removed later, but it turns out not 
to be crucial. 
 
The interest rate depends on the amount of debt that the government is 
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Equation (4) shows how the interest rate increases with debt. For low 
values of debt, the interest rate is π -α  as the marginal buyer is a shareholder. 
For high values of debt, the interest rate increases to π  as the marginal buyer of 
debt is now an entrepreneur. An important observation is that the assumption 
that financial frictions are small implies that the interest rate always exceeds the 
growth rate. 
 
Let  Kt denote the world capital stock, which is: 
 
(5)  t t D 1 K − =  
 
Equation (5) simply says that capital and debt must add to world savings, since 
they are the only investment options available. Let NFAt be the US net foreign  12 
asset position, i.e. the difference between US wealth and the US capital stock. 
This is a measure of US capital exports to the rest of the world, and is given by: 
 
(6)  t t t t t K ) 5 . 0 ( D ) 5 . 0 ( NFA ⋅ κ − + ⋅ δ − =  
 
Equation (6) shows that the net foreign asset position of the US contains 
two pieces. The first term is the difference between the debt held by US 
residents and the debt issued by the US government, that is, the first term is US 
net borrowing. The second term is the difference between the capital stock 
owned by US residents and the capital stock located within the US, that is, the 
second term is US net holdings of equity.
9  
 
The mechanics of this model are as follows: Equations (2)-(4) jointly 
determine the dynamics of debt and the interest rate for a given sequence of 
primary deficits. With these dynamics at hand, Equations (5) and (6) determine 
the world capital stock and the pattern of trade. With the help of an additional 
assumption on how these deficits are distributed among old individuals, Equation 
(1) describes the welfare of different individuals. It is straightforward to see that 
this world economy has a unique equilibrium. We are now ready to use this 
simple model to provide a first analysis of the evolution of the world economy 
during the last decade. 
 
 
2. Conventional views 
 
Although stylized, this model captures well some conventional views of 
the sources and effects of the large and persistent deterioration in the US net 
                                                
9 Note that US residents own half of the world debt and half of the world capital stock. 
This only because we have assumed both regions have the same population size, the 
same distribution of types and the same endowment. This is just a harmless 
simplification as it is straightforward to generalize the model to include asymmetries in 
these variables.  Note also that since we have assumed that government debt consists 
of one-period bonds and firms last only one period, the current account is equal to the 
net foreign asset position and we can use Equation (6) to talk about either concept. This 
is another simplification, of course, since the real world contains long-lived assets. But it 
will not play a role in what follows.  13 
foreign asset position during the last decade. According to these views, in the 
second half of the 1990s the US became a more attractive place to invest 
relative to the rest of the world. That is, the number of good investment projects 
in the US grew relative to ROW (i.e. there was an increase in κ t). Many have 
identified the boom in the information technology (IT) sector as a main reason for 
this. Although this sector grew rapidly worldwide in the second half of the 1990s, 
the US benefited more from this growth due to its strong technological lead 
relative to Europe and Japan. Others have pointed to the flurry of currency and 
banking crises in emerging markets as the main reason for the US becoming a 
more attractive place to invest relative to ROW. These crises, which started in 
Mexico and moved to East Asia and Russia, led to a downward reassessment of 
the expected return to emerging market projects.  
 
For either or both of these reasons, the story goes, investors all over the 
world decided to put their savings into the US stock market and this is what 
generated the current account deficits of the second half of the 1990s. This is 
consistent with the evidence reported in Figure 2 that, in the second half of the 
1990s, a large component of the change in the US net foreign asset position 
consisted of a decline in net holdings of equity. The story becomes a bit fuzzy 
when it comes to explaining the reversal in net holdings of equity that took place 
in the first half of the 2000s, also reported in Figure 2. In the context of our 
model, this reversal could be seen as a decline in the number of good 
investment projects in the US grew relative to ROW (i.e. there was a decrease in 
κ t), although there is scant direct evidence supporting this view.  
 
Although this account might sound reasonable at a superficial level, it 
should be met with a healthy dose of skepticism after looking at the actual 
numbers. Remember that value of the stock market increased threefold from 
1995 to 2000 and then declined by one-quarter from 2000 to 2003. If the stock 
market contains only productive firms, its value reflects that of the stock of 
capital held by these firms. That is, the increase in stock market capitalization 
requires a comparable increase in the price of capital, or the stock of capital or 
both. Since capital is reproducible, its price cannot exceed the cost of producing  14 
additional units. In the model, this cost is constant and equal to one. Naturally, 
we could extend the model to allow for congestion effects on the cost of capital 
as in the popular Q-theory of investment. But it seems unlikely that such an 
extension would be able to explain much of the rise in the value of the stock 
market.
10   
 
Neither can this rise and fall be explained by an increase in the stock of 
capital. In the model world savings grow at a constant rate γ , and so a large 
increase in the US stock of capital would have to be associated with a decline in 
ROW’s stock of capital. However, the increase in stock market capitalization 
took place all around the industrial world. Naturally, one could extend the model 
to allow for increases in savings and therefore the capital stock.  But this would 
not get us very far quantitatively.  Since the US capital stock is about twice US 
GNP, a three-fold increase in the stock of capital during the second half of the 
1990s would have required astronomical investment rates! The question 
remains: how did the value of the stock market grow so much in the second half 
of the 1990s and then drop in the first half of the 2000s?
11 
 
  Of course, there have also been many voices arguing that the US stock 
market during this period was fueled by a bubble rather than by an increase in 
US productivity relative to the rest of the world. According to this alternative 
view, foreign investors were not buying US firms in the IT sector because of their 
high productivity, but instead because they were expecting to resell them later at 
a higher price. The appearance of a bubble brings huge capital gains to those 
that are able to “create” it, and this could explain the massive increases in equity 
prices during the second half of the 1990s. But to realize these capital gains one 
must first find buyers for the bubble, and this is only possible if the bubble 
                                                
10 Hall [2001] estimates the price of installed capital in the US since 1946, and finds that 
this price increased by only about 25 percent during the second half of the 1990s. See 
also Hall [2004] for an attempt to measure the cost of capital. 
11 Hall [2001] argues that the increase in the total value of the stock market reflects 
massive accumulation of intangible capital. This increase is mostly a windfall, since it did 
not require significant investment expenditures. As Ventura [2001] points out, it is hard to 
see why this intangible capital suddenly disappeared in 2000.  15 
promises a sufficiently attractive return. That is, a bubble can be created if and 
only if it is expected to grow fast enough so as to justify buying it.  
 
It is possible to examine this alternative interpretation within our model. 
To do this, we formally define a stock market bubble as a situation in which firms 
without capital are valued and traded in the stock market. We refer to these firms 
as “bubbly” firms, as opposed to the “productive” firms that own the capital stock. 
The question is whether bubbly firms can survive in a stock market that also 
contains productive firms. Let Bt be the asset bubble (or aggregate value of 
bubbly firms as a share of world savings). Since bubbly firms do not distribute 
dividends, the return to holding them consists only of their price appreciation. 
Therefore, the young will buy these firms if and only if the expected rate of price 
appreciation is high enough: 
 





1 t t > ≥ ⋅ γ +
+  
 
Otherwise, the young would prefer to hold shares in productive firms or 
government bonds. A bubble can therefore create its own demand only by 
growing on average as fast or faster than the interest rate. But the growth of the 
bubble cannot be so fast so as to outgrow world savings, i.e. Bt≤ 1 must hold in 
all dates and states of nature. And this requirement is incompatible with 
Equation (7) if the interest rate exceeds the growth rate. Therefore, we conclude 
that bubbly firms cannot survive in the stock market in this case. Our assumption 
that financial frictions are small rules implies that the interest rate always 
exceeds the growth rates and therefore rules out the possibility of stock market 
bubbles. This, we think, is the first serious shortcoming of the standard or 
conventional view. 
 
This view also holds that the current account deficits continued after 
2000 due to the sharp change in fiscal policy implemented by the Bush 
administration (i.e. an increase in the US primary deficit that leads to an increase 
in δ t). This fiscal policy consists of spending more, cutting taxes, and financing  16 
the resulting budget deficits by issuing government debt. Overwhelmingly, this 
change in policy has been interpreted as a political decision and not as an 
economic policy response to a specific macroeconomic disturbance. In other 
words, the US fiscal expansion has been treated as an “exogenous” shock to the 
macroeconomic landscape.  Much of the increment to public debt has been 
placed abroad.  Between end-2000 and end-2003 US public debt increased by 
$500 billion, while foreign holdings of US treasury bills increased by almost the 
same amount.  And to the extent that public debt has been placed at home, it 
likely has crowded out US corporate debt and forced firms to place an increasing 
fraction of their own debt abroad. Through these direct and indirect channels, the 
budget deficits of the Bush administration account for a substantial part of the 
large increase in net borrowing from abroad shown in Figure 2.  The important 
question is whether this situation is sustainable and, if it is not, how the 
necessary adjustment will look. 
 
To answer this question, we use the model to analyze the effects of a 
fiscal expansion in the US. The experiment is as follows. Initially both regions 
have no debt and follow balanced-budget policies, i.e. Dt=0 and  0 T
* I I i
t , i = ∑
∪ ∈
. At 
some date, the US switches its policy for exogenous reasons and decides to 
increase spending, cut taxes and finance the resulting deficit by going into debt, 
while ROW keeps its budget balanced, i.e.  0 T T
I i
t , i > = ∑
∈
 and  0 T
* I i
t , i = ∑
∈
. The 
questions we address next are: What are the possible endings for this fiscal 
episode? What are its welfare consequences? 
 
When the fiscal deficits appear, government debt starts growing at an 
accelerating rate, crowding out the investments of the shareholders. The growth 
of the debt is fueled directly by the deficits, but also indirectly by unfavourable 
debt dynamics resulting from the interest rate exceeding the growth rate. In fact, 
it is this second component growing over time that leads to accelerating debt 
growth. If the fiscal expansion lasts long enough, the debt also starts crowding 
out the investments of the entrepreneurs. At this point the interest rate goes up, 
debt dynamics become more unfavourable and debt accumulation further  17 
accelerates. As debt accumulates, US net borrowing abroad increases. Since 
the debt crowds out capital from the portfolios of investors worldwide, US net 
holdings of equity decline in absolute value. 
 
This situation is not sustainable since the accelerating growth rate of debt 
is incompatible with a fixed pool of savings, and the US eventually must go 
through a period of fiscal adjustment. This essentially means that the US must 
reverse its fiscal policy (since it does not want to default) and start running 
sufficiently large surpluses, i.e.  t
t
I i
t , i D
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. Not surprisingly, the 
magnitude of the fiscal adjustment increases with the level of debt. When the 
debt is higher, the surpluses need to be larger, last longer, or both. 
 
Assuming that the US government only makes transfers to US citizens, 
the fiscal expansion increases the welfare of current US generations in detriment 
of future ones. After all, in this model a policy of budget deficits is nothing but a 
policy of passing the bill forward. When this policy is implemented, the old 
consume beyond the return to their savings and pass the bill to the next 
generation. This bill includes their extra consumption plus the interest. Rather 
than paying the bill, the next generation further increases it by also consuming 
more than the return to their savings and then passes the bill along to the 
following generation. This keeps going on for as long as the government follows 
a policy of running deficits and rolling over the debt. But the bill is growing too 
fast and must eventually be paid. This is what a fiscal adjustment is all about. 
The longer it takes for this adjustment to happen, the larger is the final bill and 
the costlier will be for the US to face it. 
 
  The welfare of present generations is also affected by the fiscal 
expansion indirectly through its effects on the interest rate. High interest rates 
raise the expected consumption of young shareholders both in the US and 
ROW. Since interest rate costs are added to the bill, future generations of US 
residents are also supporting higher consumption of current ROW generations. 
This constitutes a positive spillover of the US fiscal expansion on ROW. The  18 
fiscal adjustment will eliminate it and this is why ROW residents might prefer this 
to happen as late as possible. 
 
Of course, one could argue that this scenario is unrealistic since it 
assumes that the US government will honor its debt in all contingencies. But 
relaxing this assumption has only minor effects on the overall story. To see this, 
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where µ t  is the (exogenous) probability that the US government defaults on its 
debt. A reasonable assumption is that this probability grows as the debt 
increases, but we need not make it here. Equation (8) recognizes that now debt 
can be defaulted upon, while Equation (9) recognizes that the expected return 
on government debt includes the promised return minus the expected loss from 
default. Note that default risk makes debt dynamics even more unfavourable by 
raising the interest rate. In other words, default risk makes the current situation 
even more unsustainable. 
 
With a positive default probability the US fiscal expansion might have a 
different ending. If the current deficit goes on long enough and the required fiscal 
adjustment becomes too large, the US government might simply default on its 
debt. In this case, the adjustment takes place in a dramatic fashion. The 
generation of old (US and ROW) shareholders that suffers the default pays the 
entire bill for the excess consumption of its US predecessors. Since half of the 
                                                
12 One can think of default as surprise inflation that erases the real value of the debt. 
Here we are also assuming that the ROW government keeps with its policy of having no 
debt. Otherwise, we should also “break down” Equations (8)-(9) into their two regional 
components.   19 
shareholders are not US residents, half of the bill is therefore paid by ROW 
citizens. In this scenario, current US economic policy is simply increasing 
consumption and welfare of current US residents at the expense of future US 
and ROW residents. This constitutes a negative spillover of the US fiscal 
expansion on ROW. A fiscal adjustment would ensure that this scenario does 
not happen and, as a result, ROW residents might prefer the US to reduce its 
budget deficits even if this lowers the interest rate. 
 
One problem with this standard story is the behavior of the interest rate. 
While the model predicts that the US fiscal expansion will increase the interest 
rate, the evidence shows exactly the opposite. Figure 4 showed that, in the midst 
of one of the largest fiscal expansions in US history, the interest rate fell from 
above three percent to close to zero percent. The model can only account for 
this observation if there is a decline in the expected return to capital (i.e. a 
decline in π ) and/or an increase in agency costs (i.e. an increase in α ).
13 Given 
the magnitude of both the fall in interest rates and the increase in budget deficits, 
the decline in productivity and/or a increase in agency costs would have to be 
very large. There is scant evidence for a major decline in world productivity. And 
despite the intense media coverage of some financial scandals such as Enron or 
Parmalat, it is also unlikely that frictions in financial markets increased 
dramatically overnight. In our view, the inability to predict the behavior of the 
interest rate constitutes a second serious shortcoming of the conventional view. 
 
  To sum up, the model crudely but effectively encapsulates conventional 
views of the US current account deficit. Its appearance in the second half of the 
1990s reflects an increase in US productivity relative to the rest of the world that 
led investors all over the world to place their savings in the US stock market. 
This situation ended with the stock market collapse in 2000. But the current 
account deficits continued after this now fueled by the drastic change in fiscal 
policy implemented by the Bush administration. This policy is however 
unsustainable and something must eventually give. Most observers think that 
                                                
13 We have assumed that π  and α  are constant. Note however that all the equations of 
the model still apply if we assume that these parameters vary stochastically over time.  20 
this episode will end with a painful fiscal adjustment, although there are also 
those who argue that the resolution will entail some default on the part of the US 
government. The stylized model developed above shows how all of these 
observations fit together.  
 
But the model is not free of problems, though. It cannot explain observed 
movements in equity prices, nor can it explain why the interest rate fell in the 
midst of one of the largest fiscal expansions in US history. How can we come to 
grips with these observations? The preceding analysis relies to a large extent on 
the condition that the interest rate exceeds the growth rate. This condition rules 
out the existence of stock market bubbles and underlies the notion that a policy 
of continued fiscal deficits is unsustainable. But this condition is not satisfied in 
the data. Figure 5 plots the ex-post real one-year Treasury bill rate and the real 
GDP growth rate for the US since 1970. With the exception of the 1980s, the 
interest rate has been consistently below the growth rate for almost all years 
during this period. More importantly for our purposes, since 1992 interest rates 
have averaged 1.7 percent while GDP growth has averaged 3.3 percent. As we 
shall show next, the behavior of the world economy is quite different when the 
growth rate exceeds the interest rate. 
 
 
3. A model of crowding-out with debt, bubbles and capital 
 
Assume next that agency costs are severe, i.e. α >π -γ . This is equivalent 
to saying that financial frictions are large and the stock market is far from the 
frictionless paradigm. To analyze this case, we need to generalize a bit the 
theory since now the world economy can experience stock market bubbles. 
Consider the possibility that the stock market contains unproductive or bubbly 
firms that never deliver a dividend. The only reason to hold these firms is to 
realize capital gains. We assume that creating bubbly firms is simply a matter of 
luck and entails negligible costs. Naturally, all young try to create them and 
those that are successful obtain a rent by selling their bubbly firm during old  21 
age.
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t , i t N N  is the total value of the bubbly firms that appear at date t. 
Note that the expected (gross) return on holding a bubbly firm is equal to the 
(gross) growth rate of its price. This growth rate is equal to the expected value of 
tomorrow’s bubbly firms at date t+1, i.e. γ
t+1⋅ {} 1 t 1 t t N B E + + − ; divided by their value 
at date t, i.e. γ
t⋅ Bt.
15 Equation (10) exhibits two differences with respect to 
Equation (1). Bubbly firms are now included in the menu of assets and this 
affects the expected return on the savings of the young. In addition, the creation 
of new bubbly firms generates rents for the old and this constitutes an additional 
source of income. 
 
Equations (2) and (3) describing debt dynamics still apply, but we must 
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14 Success is nothing but a positive realization of an individual-specific sunspot. 
15 Equation (6) implicitly assumed a fixed number of bubbly firms. In this case, the 
expected growth rate of the bubble equals the expected price appreciation of existing 
bubbly firms. 
16 We assume again that governments never default on their debts. As shown before, it 
is straightforward to generalize the analysis to the case in which there is an exogenous 
probability that governments default on their debts.  22 
Equation (11) recognizes that debt and the bubble both compete with capital for 
the savings of the young. In order to create its own demand, the bubble must 
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Equation (12) is a necessary condition for the young to be willing to buy bubbly 
firms. It applies whenever bubbly firms have a positive value in equilibrium. We 
shall construct later equilibria in which bubbly firms not only survive in the stock 
market, but drive all productive firms out of it. Finally, let β t be share of all bubbly 
firms created by US residents. It then follows that: 
 












− ⋅ β = ⋅ β
I i
1 t , i
I I i




The presence of a bubble naturally affects asset trade. The world capital 
stock is now given by: 
 
(14)  t t t B D 1 K − − =  
 
and the capital stock of the US is then κ t⋅ (1-Dt-Bt). The US net foreign asset 
position is now given as follows: 
 
(15)  ) B D 1 ( ) 5 . 0 ( B ) 5 . 0 ( D ) 5 . 0 ( NFA t t t t t t t t − − ⋅ κ − + ⋅ β − + ⋅ δ − =  
 
Equation (15) is a natural generalization of Equation (6) and includes an 
additional piece of the net foreign asset position of the US. This piece is the 
second term and consists of the difference between the share of the bubble held 
by US residents and the share of the bubble created by them. Now, the US net 
holdings of equity are given by the sum of the second and third terms of 
Equation (6).  23 
 
The mechanics of this model are very close to those of the model in 
section 1:  Equations (2), (11), (12) and (13) describe the dynamics of debt and 
the interest rate for a given sequence of bubbles and deficits. With these 
dynamics at hand, Equations (14) and (15) determine the world capital stock and 
the pattern of trade. With the help of additional assumptions about the creation 
of new bubbly firms and the distribution of deficits among individuals, Equation 
(10) describes the welfare of each individual. This world economy has many 
equilibria now, each of them corresponding to a different set of (consistent) 
assumptions about the behavior of bubbles and deficits. We shall later construct 
some of these equilibria and examine their implications. 
 
This model allows us to study the large and persistent deterioration of the 
US net foreign asset position under the more realistic assumption that the 
interest rate falls short of the growth rate.  As is well known, this condition 
implies that the world economy contains pockets of dynamically inefficient 
investments.
17 The logic behind this inefficiency is disarmingly simple and well 
understood: every period young shareholders invest γ
t⋅ (1-ε ) units of the single 
good, while old shareholders receive a return to their savings that on average 
equals rt⋅γ
t-1⋅ (1-ε ). If rt<γ , it is welfare-improving to implement a social contract 
whereby all young shareholders are forced to stop investing and instead give all 
of their income to the old shareholders. This social contract would liberate an 
amount of resources equal to (γ -rt) ⋅γ
t-1⋅ (1-ε ) per period, and these resources 
would go directly to the pockets of the future shareholders. Moreover, the 
                                                
17 In an influential paper, Abel et al. [1989] noticed that capital income exceeds 
investment in industrial countries and then argued that this observation is incompatible 
with the view that these countries contain dynamically inefficient investments. Their 
argument is misleading however. To see this, note that in our world economy capital 
income is [π -α⋅ (1-ε )]⋅γ
t-1 while investment is γ
t. The observation that capital income 
exceeds investment, i.e. π -α⋅ (1-ε )>γ ; does not rule out the possibility that there exist 
pockets of dynamic inefficiency, i.e. γ >π -α . The observation that capital income exceeds 
investment only implies that the “average” investment is dynamically efficient. But this is 
not incompatible with the statement that the “marginal” investment be dynamically 
inefficient. Abel et al. [1989] did not notice this because they assumed throughout that 
financial markets are frictionless and, as a result, all investments exhibit the same return. 
This corresponds to the special case of our model in which α =0. This is an unrealistic 
and yet crucial assumption. Once we remove it, the argument of Abel et al. does not go 
through.  24 
generation that starts the social contract would get an upfront fee (for its service 
to society) that equals the endowment of the first generation of young that 
participate in the social contract, i.e. γ
t⋅ (1-ε ). This social contract therefore 




At first sight, the practical difficulties in implementing this social contract 
appear overwhelming. But this is only a false appearance. It has been known for 
a long time that government debt and stock market bubbles can both crowd out 
inefficient investments and improve welfare. Complying with the social contract 
during youth and giving the endowment to the old can be seen as equivalent to 
purchasing the “right” to receive the endowment of the young during old age. But 
this exactly what government debt or stock market bubbles are. When the young 
buy any of these assets from the old (and thus give the old their endowment), 
they are doing so in the expectation of reselling them to the young later during 
their old age (and therefore receiving the endowment of the young). In this way, 
government debt and stock market bubbles eliminate inefficient investments and 
liberate resources that increase the consumption of all future generations. Since 
issuing debt or creating bubbly firms has negligible costs, those that “create” 
them receive in addition an upfront fee or rent which equals the full value of the 
asset created. This upfront fee or pure rent is exactly what Ti,t and Ni,t are. 
 
As the previous discussion hints, the presence of pockets of dynamic 
inefficiency might lead to a substantial rethinking of the role of fiscal policy. 
Naturally, fiscal policy still redistributes consumption across generations. But it 
now also eliminates inefficient investments. Since bubbles are an alternative and 
market-generated solution to the same problem, this observation raises some 
interesting and still unanswered questions: Under what conditions does fiscal 
policy complement stock market bubbles as a mechanism to eliminate inefficient 
investments? Under what conditions does fiscal policy compete with stock 
market bubbles for this role? What are the welfare implications of these 
                                                
18 Since entrepreneurs receive an expected gross return to their savings that exceeds 
the growth rate, their investments are dynamically efficient and the government should 
not try to eliminate them.  25 
interactions between bubbles and deficits? We next show that the answers to 




4. A “benevolent” view of US economic policy 
 
  We next construct an equilibrium in which the stock market initially 
creates a bubble that is large enough to crowd out all inefficient investments. 
The world economy operates efficiently and welfare is high. But there is a 
change in investor sentiment that triggers the collapse of the bubble. The result 
is that inefficient investments reappear. The government reacts to this by 
running large deficits that crowd out some of these investments and improve the 
functioning of the world economy. In this equilibrium, the US fiscal expansion 
constitutes a welfare-improving policy response to the bubble collapse. 
 
Consider the case of a world economy in which investor sentiment 
fluctuates between two states: St∈ {L,H}. In the L (or low) state, investors are 
“pessimistic”, bubbly firms are not valued, and the stock market contains only 
productive firms. In the H (or high) state, investors are “optimistic”, bubbly firms 
are valued, and they completely crowd productive firms out of the stock market. 
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We shall assume also that Nt=0 for all t, except for those dates in which the 
world economy transitions from L to H and Nt=Bt. That is, all bubbly firms appear 
at the onset of the bubble. After this, no more bubbly firms are created and the 
stock market bubble contains only a fixed number of firms whose value 
fluctuates over time. 
  26 
How do these changes in investor sentiment happen?  We assume that 
individuals coordinate to an equilibrium using a sunspot variable that moves 
between the high and low states. We refer to this variable as “investor 
sentiment”. Assume the transition probability or probability that there is a change 
in investor sentiment is λ . When a generation is optimistic, it believes that the 
probability the next generation will buy the bubble is 1-λ . When a generation is 
pessimistic, it believes that the probability the next generation will buy the bubble 
is λ . If λ  is sufficiently small, optimistic generations buy the bubble, pessimistic 
generations do not, and the probabilities assigned by both types of generations 
are exactly the equilibrium ones. We assume from now on that γ⋅ (1-λ )>π -α >γ⋅λ . 
As we shall see, this ensures that these changes in investor sentiment are an 
equilibrium. We shall see that a change in investor sentiment that moves the 
world economy from the high to the low state is nothing but a coordination 
failure, since the low state provides less welfare than the high state. 
 
The fiscal policy of the US government recognizes the beneficial role that 
bubbly firms play in the world economy and avoids competing with them. When 
investor sentiment is high, the government refrains from running budget deficits 
and lets the (stock) market eliminate the inefficient investments on its own. 
When investor sentiment is low, the market cannot do this and the government 
runs budget deficits in order to help. These deficits raise government debt and 
crowd out the inefficient investments that the market is unable to eliminate by 
itself. In particular, we assume the US follows this fiscal policy: 
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We shall see that this fiscal policy ensures that government debt eventually 
absorbs all inefficient investments if investor sentiment remains low indefinitely.  
However, consistent with the view that the government is trying to remedy 
market failures, debt will never crowd out the investments of entrepreneurs.  27 
Throughout, and only for simplicity, we assume that ROW has no debt and 
follows a balanced-budget policy, i.e. δ t=1 and  0 T
* I i
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Equation (18) shows that the implications of increased government debt on the 
interest rate depend crucially on investor sentiment. Note that the assumptions 
made ensure that the interest rate is always higher when investor sentiment is 
high.  When investor sentiment is low, the interest rate is low because debt 
competes with capital and the latter offers a low expected return to shareholders. 
When investor sentiment is high, the interest rate is high because debt competes 
with the bubble which is a better asset than capital. It follows from Equation (15) 
(and the assumption that Nt=0) that the interest rate is nothing but the expected 
(gross) growth rate of the bubble. 
 
To understand what is behind Equation (18), assume first that there is no 
government debt. Then, the expected growth rate of the bubble is γ  if there is no 
change in investor sentiment, but zero if there is a change in investor sentiment. 
Since the latter happens with probability λ , the expected growth rate of the 
bubble is γ⋅ (1-λ ) and this is what the interest rate must be when Dt=0. Assume 
instead that there is some debt in the world economy. Since debt dynamics are 
favourable and both governments follow a policy of balanced budgets, we have 
that the debt is falling and the bubble is replacing it. Therefore, the bubble grows 
faster than the world economy since it absorbs an increasing fraction of the 
                                                
19 To derive the interest rate when St=H, substitute Equations (2), (16) and (17) into 
Equation (12) and then solve for the interest rate. Note that when St=L and Dt=1-ε , any 
rt∈ [π -α ,γ ] is also an equilibrium.  28 
shareholders’ savings. The larger is the debt, the faster it falls and the faster is 
the growth of the bubble and the interest rate.  
 
Under the assumptions made about bubbles and deficits, the dynamics 
of debt are given by Equations (2) and (17)-(18). Substituting these dynamics 
into Equation (16), we also obtain the dynamics of the bubble. It is 
straightforward to check that, under our parameter restrictions, the sequences of 
bubbles and debt generated by these equations satisfy the conditions that Bt≤ 1 
and Dt≤ 1 in all dates and states of nature. This confirms that these sequences 
constitute an equilibrium of the world economy. We use next this equilibrium to 
re-interpret the main macroeconomic developments of the last decade. 
 
This equilibrium portrays an alternative and “benevolent” view of current 
US economic policy. The story goes as follows. Initially the world starts in the 
pessimistic state with the US having some intermediate level of debt and a low 
interest rate, i.e. 0<Dt<1-ε  and rt=π -α . At some date, there is a change in investor 
sentiment and a stock market bubble appears. The bulk of this bubble consists 
of US bubbly firms, i.e. ∑
∈ I i
t , i N >0.5. After a few periods, there is a new change in 
investor sentiment that moves the world economy back into the pessimistic 
state. This brings about a collapse in the bubble. The questions we address next 
are: What are the macroeconomic effects of the appearance and bursting of the 
bubble? What are the effects of US fiscal policy? 
 
  Figure 6 illustrates the dynamics of debt by plotting Dt+1 as a function of 
Dt.  The convex upward-sloping line captures the dynamics of debt when 
investor sentiment is high, while the straight upward-sloping line shows the same 
when investor sentiment is low.  The economy starts out with low investor 
sentiment and an initial level of debt D*.  Debt dynamics are favourable and debt 
increases at a decreasing rate.  Absent any further shocks it would 
asymptotically reach an upper bound of 1-ε  where it would fully crowd out all the 
inefficient investments of the shareholders.  However, before this (when debt is 
equal to D0) investor sentiment changes and a bubble appears in the stock  29 
market.  The government reacts to this by eliminating the budget deficit, and 
debt begins to fall.  Absent any further shocks debt would asymptotically reach 
zero as it is no longer needed to crowd out inefficient investments.  Before this 
happens, there is again a change in investor sentiment (when debt is equal to 
D1) and the bubble collapses.  The government responds with fiscal deficits that 
set debt on an upward trajectory again. 
 
During the period before the bubble appears, US debt accumulates 
gradually and the net foreign asset position becomes more negative as some of 
this debt is held by foreigners.  The government responds to the appearance of 
the bubble by eliminating the budget deficit, and debt accordingly begins to 
decline.  The bubble provides shareholders with a more attractive investment 
option and therefore crowds out all productive firms from the stock market.  As 
time passes, government debt declines and the bubble keeps growing and 
absorbing an increasing fraction of the savings of the shareholders.  Despite the 
elimination of the budget deficit, the interest rate jumps up as government debt 
must now compete with the bubble for the savings of shareholders. The interest 
rate then declines slowly as the growth rate of the bubble also declines over 
time.  The net foreign asset position jumps down as the US old sell their bubbly 
firms to the ROW young, and the composition of the net foreign asset position of 
the US shifts from debt to equity.  
 
This rosy situation changes overnight as a result of a change in investor 
sentiment that brings about a collapse in the bubble. The inefficient investments 
of shareholders return. The US government reacts to this situation by 
engineering a fiscal expansion that eliminates these inefficient investments over 
time. Unlike the analysis of section two, debt dynamics are favourable and the 
debt grows at a decelerating rate, eventually stabilizing without the need for a 
fiscal adjustment. Despite the appearance of budget deficits, the interest rate 
jumps down and stays low since debt no longer competes with the bubble. The 
collapse of the bubble erases a fraction of the negative US net holdings of 
equity, and leads to a sharp increase in net foreign assets.  But this is quickly 
reversed as US government debt accumulates.  
  30 
This story is therefore broadly consistent with the evidence presented in 
the introduction.  It can account for the boom in the stock market and the sharp 
decline in budget deficits during the second half of the 1990s, as well as the 
collapse of the stock market and the re-emergence of fiscal deficits during the 
early 2000s.  It can explain why interest rates were high during a period of low 
budget deficits, but fell when high budget deficits returned.  It can account for the 
decline in the net foreign asset position associated with the appearance of the 
bubble.  Moreover, by virtue of the assumption that the bubble was created 
primarily in the US, it can account for the large expansion in foreign purchases of 
US equity during the second half of the 1990s, followed by a sharp reversal.  
This reversal in US net holdings of equity is offset by a decline in US net 
holdings of debt as the US government issues debt and sells part of it to 
foreigners. 
 
The welfare implications of this scenario are easy to spot. The 
appearance of the bubble brings about an extraordinary bonanza for the current 
generation of old, since they cash in the rents from bubble creation and enjoy an 
unexpectedly high level of consumption. This windfall is equivalent to the upfront 
fee of implementing the part of the social contract that the debt was not 
implementing, i.e. γ
t⋅ (1-ε -Dt). This fee is unevenly distributed since we have 
assumed that most of the bubble was created by US residents. The following 
generations of US and ROW shareholders are not so well off as the previous 
one, since there is no further creation of bubbly firms. But they still enjoy the 
benefit of a high interest rate, and this increases the consumption and welfare of 
shareholders all around the world. Through the high interest shareholders 
receive all the gains from eliminating their inefficient investments just as in the 
social contract, i.e. (γ -π +α )⋅γ
t-1⋅ (1-ε ).
20 In this world economy, a stock market 
bubble is a very good thing since it implements the social contract and 
everybody benefits. 
 
                                                
20 To understand the welfare implications for the subsequent generations, simply 
remember that trading the bubble essentially means that each generation of 
shareholders receives the endowment of the next one in exchange of its own.  31 
The collapse of the bubble brings substantial hardship to the 
contemporary generation of shareholders, who bought the bubble during their 
youth and find out in their old age that it is worthless. Somewhat unfairly, this 
generation of shareholders pays a dear price for the fact that the next generation 
of the young decides to “break the social contract” and not buy the bubble from 
them. This price can be understood as the devolution of the upfront fee for 
destroying the social contract, i.e. γ
t⋅ (1-ε -Dt). Subsequent generations do not 
suffer as much although they still find that interest rates are low and, as a result, 
so are their consumption and welfare. The gains from eliminating the inefficient 
investments are lost. The bursting of the bubble is a coordination failure and 
everybody loses from it. 
 
The US fiscal expansion offsets part of this loss for US residents. To see 
this, note that we can use Equation (2) to decompose the revenues from the 





t T , into two components. The first one consists of 
the gains from eliminating inefficient investments, i.e. (γ -rt)⋅γ
t-1⋅ Dt. The second 
one consists of the upfront fee for creating debt, i.e. γ
t⋅ (Dt+1-Dt). That is, the US 
government is gradually implementing the social contract and distributing the 
gains to the different US generations in the form of transfers, i.e. higher 
spending and lower taxes. ROW residents do not benefit from this US fiscal 
policy because they are assumed not to receive transfer from the US 
government and the interest rate remains low throughout.
21 
 
  This analysis departs fundamentally from the conventional view in two 
important respects. The first one is that the fiscal expansion is now seen as 
sustainable, while in section two it was deemed unsustainable. The second 
difference is that the fiscal expansion is now seen as benefiting all generations, 
while in section two it was perceived as a means to re-distribute consumption 
from future to present generations. Both of these differences, of course, are a 
                                                
21 They would benefit too though, if we had postulated a concave technology rather than 
a linear one, since the debt would raise the interest rate. And this would be a positive 
spillover of the US fiscal expansion abroad.   32 
direct consequence of removing the unrealistic assumption, which underlies 
conventional views, that the interest rate exceeds the growth rate. 
 
  How plausible is this “benevolent” view of US economic policy? A first 
objection to it comes from a simple numerical observation. Favourable debt 
dynamics mean that debt accumulation decelerates and eventually stabilizes. 











. In this case, government debt starts crowding out efficient 
investments before stabilizing and this turns favourable debt dynamics into 
unfavourable ones. If the deficits are too large, the situation is unsustainable 
even if the world economy contains pockets of dynamic inefficiency. This seems 
to be the situation nowadays. The US economy is about forty percent of the 
world economy. Its (net) growth rate is about three percent, the (net) interest rate 
is about one and a half percent, and the budget deficit remains at five percent of 
US GNP. Under these assumptions, by the time US government debt stabilizes 
it has already surpassed world savings by almost forty percent! The current 
budget deficits are not sustainable and this seems an unobjectionable 
conclusion to us.   
 
   But this does not mean however that the “benevolent” view is incorrect. 
The essence of this view is that the US government is supplying an asset 
(government debt) that is useful to eliminate inefficient investments, and it is 
receiving payments (deficits) for this service. The time profile of deficits reflects 
how these payments are distributed across the different generations. We made 
the simple assumption in Equation (16) that these benefits grew at the same rate 
as the world economy, i.e. so that generation t obtained γ
t+1⋅ T. But this is 
obviously not the option that the current US government has chosen. We get 
much closer to the actual behavior of the US government if we replace Equation 
(17) by the following one: 
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Under this new assumption on fiscal policy, Equation (18) describing the interest 
rate still applies. The dynamics of debt under this fiscal policy are now however 
very different. When the bubble bursts, the US responds by engineering a very 
large fiscal expansion.  In particular, it immediately expands debt by exactly the 
amount required to absorb all of the savings of the shareholders, and then 
stabilizes debt at this level by running much smaller deficits.  The first generation 
after the bubble collapses receives the entire upfront fee. Future generations 
then simply receive the gains from eliminating inefficient investments. Whether 
this choice of distribution of gains corresponds to a preference for the current 
generation or, instead, to a desire to compensate the generation that lost the 
bubble is unclear. But to make the “benevolent” view consistent with observed 
policy one must assume that the lion’s share of the gains that accrue from 
supplying government debt are being reaped by the current generation. 
 
This view is comes surprisingly close to capturing actual US fiscal policy.  
Suppose that the decline in the value of the stock market between 2000 and 
2003, equalling a bit more than $3 trillion, represents the elimination of the 
bubble. According to this benevolent view the US government should run large 
fiscal deficits to quickly expand public debt by about the same amount.    
Interestingly, according to the baseline projections of the US Congressional 
Budget Office, public debt will expand by $2.6 trillion between 2000 and 2012, 
and then stabilize thanks to much smaller projected budget deficits of around 2 
percent of GDP.  This suggests that projected fiscal policy over the next several 
years will be successful in eliminating almost as many inefficient investments as 
the stock market bubble did in the 1990s. 
 
Of course, it is possible that a bubble reappears in the stock market in 
the future, and this would require an adjustment in fiscal policy. According to the  34 
benevolent view, the government should respond to the reappearance of a stock 
market bubble by eliminating the fiscal deficits. In the context of our model, 
whether this fiscal adjustment will be painful or not depends on who issues the 
bubble.  If the US is lucky and the new bubble is mostly created by US residents, 
then the rents from bubble creation will make for most of the lost budget deficits. 
And if this is the case, the US net foreign asset position will remain negative as 
US residents on net sell their bubbly firms to foreigners. If instead it is mostly 
ROW residents that issue the new bubble, then the fiscal adjustment would be 
costly since US residents would not be compensated for the loss of the budget 
deficits. In this case, the US net foreign asset position would turn positive as US 
debt declines and ROW residents sell bubbly firms to US ones. 
 
  Central to our model is the result that providing an asset that eliminates 
inefficient investments yields a benefit or fee to those that create it. According to 
the benevolent view, the government is “altruistic”:  it lets the private sector 
appropriate this benefit (rents from bubbly creation), and only intervenes when 
the market is incapable of providing itself with the appropriate asset. When this 
is the case, the government also receives part of this benefit (the budget 
deficits). But why would the government not want to appropriate this benefit even 
when the market works? One can also imagine that the government could be 
“opportunistic”:  it might try to displace an existing bubble and capture all the 
benefits from providing an asset that eliminates inefficient investments, and 
redistribute these benefits to its constituents. We examine next this possibility. 
 
 
5. A “cynical” view of US economic policy 
 
We consider next a situation in which there are two types of government. 
The “altruistic” government acts as in the previous section.  Rather than allow 
the private sector to capture the rents from bubble creation, the “opportunistic” 
government expands public debt and crowds out the bubble in order to capture 
these rents and distribute them to its constituents.  We construct an equilibrium 
in which initially the altruistic government is in power and the stock market  35 
creates a bubble that is large enough to crowd out all inefficient investments. 
The government responds by eliminating its budget deficits and making room for 
the bubble to grow. But there is a change in government and this leads to a 
drastic change in fiscal policy. The opportunistic government starts a fiscal 
expansion whose objective is to crowd out the bubble and in this way 
appropriate its value. In this equilibrium, the US fiscal expansion constitutes a 
“beggar-thy-neighbour” policy that is responsible for the collapse in the stock 
market. 
 
Let Gt∈ {A,O} be a state variable indicating whether the altruistic (Gt=A) or 
the opportunistic (Gt=O) government is in power, and let φ  be the probability the 
US government changes type. As in the previous section, the altruistic 
government uses fiscal policy to immediately eliminate inefficient investments 
whenever the stock market fails to do so. Therefore Equation (19) still applies 
when Gt=A. Instead, the opportunistic government uses fiscal policy to 
appropriate as many resources as possible and then distributes them as it sees 
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− ε −  is the value of productive and bubbly firms 
owned by shareholders, Equation (20) is simply saying that the opportunistic 
government runs budgets deficits that crowd out a fraction χ  of these firms. Note 
that this fiscal policy does not depend on investor sentiment. The government 
always expands debt when it arrives to power, regardless of whether this 
displaces inefficient investments or a stock market bubble. 
 
  Is the bubble in Equation (16) consistent with the existence of the 
opportunistic government? Assume first that χ  is small, so that when investor 
sentiment is high the opportunistic government displaces the bubble slowly. In  36 
this case, the expected growth rate of the bubble still exceeds the return to the 
inefficient investments. And, as a result, the bubble in Equation (16) still 
constitutes an equilibrium. The interest rate (which can be obtained by the same 
procedure we obtained Equation (18)) depends on which government is in 
power. In particular, when investor sentiment is high the interest rate will be 
lower when the opportunistic government is in power. This reflects the effect of 
fiscal policy on the size of the bubble and therefore the return it offers. The 
opportunistic government makes the bubble a worse asset and debt does not 
need to offer a high interest rate to compete with it. 
 
 Assume  instead  that  χ  is large, so that the opportunistic government 
displaces the bubble rapidly when investor sentiment is high. In this case, the 
expected growth rate of the bubble falls short of the return to the inefficient 
investments. Therefore, the demand for the bubble drops to zero and the bubble 
bursts. In this case, the arrival of an opportunistic government burst the bubble 
on impact and leads to the reemergence of inefficient investments. As a result, 
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Equation (21) recognizes that, if χ  is high enough, the bubble can only exist if 
investor sentiment is high and the government is sufficiently altruistic. From now 
on, we shall assume that the altruistic government crowds out the bubble 
immediately, i.e. χ→ 1; and we consider the bubble in Equation (21). Note that in 
this case, there is a bubbly state where both the altruistic government is in power 
and investor sentiment is high, and a non-bubbly state where either investor 
sentiment is low, the opportunistic government is in power, or both.  
  
                                                
22 Can the bubble exist even if there is an altruistic government in power? The answer is 
positive if the transition probability φ  is low enough (one example was the model of the 
previous section which is nothing but the limiting case where φ→ 0). We assume this in 
what follows.  37 











⋅ η − ε −
η − ⋅ ε − ⋅ γ
= = α − π
= + A G and H S if
D 1
) 1 ( ) 1 (





1 t   
 
where η =1-(1-λ )⋅ (1-φ ) is the probability that the economy transitions from the 
bubbly to the non-bubbly state. Note that the expression for the interest rate is 
identical to that in Equation (18), with the exception that we must replace the 
transition probability λ  with η . The intuitions are also identical: in the absence of 
a bubble, the interest rate is low since debt competes with capital and the latter 
offers a low expected return to shareholders.  When the bubble appears, the 
interest rate is high because debt competes with the bubble which is a better 
asset than capital. 
 
  Interestingly, the equilibrium of this section is observationally equivalent 
to that of the previous section.  In both equilibria, when the bubble exists, budget 
deficits are zero and the bubble absorbs all of the inefficient investments of the 
shareholders.  In both equilibria, the bursting of the bubble is accompanied by a 
large fiscal expansion that ensures that debt now performs the same task of 
eliminating inefficient investments. The welfare consequences of these two 
equilibria are also the same. When the bubble collapses, both US and ROW 
shareholders suffer large losses. US shareholders of the current generation are 
compensated for this loss by the large fiscal deficit which corresponds to the up-
front fee for creating debt, but ROW shareholders receive none of this. The 
collapse of the bubble therefore implements a transfer from ROW to the US. 
 
They key difference between the two equilibria lies in the underlying 
shock that leads to the bursting of the bubble. The first possibility corresponds to 
the “benevolent” view that we have already discussed: investor sentiment 
                                                
23 Once again, note that when St=L or Gt=O and Dt=1-ε , any rt∈ [π -α ,γ ] is also an 
equilibrium.  38 
changes exogenously, and an altruistic government responds by running large 
fiscal deficits. This policy reaction does not hurt ROW residents because the 
bubble bursts anyway, but helps US residents. The other possibility corresponds 
to a more “cynical” view: when the opportunistic government comes into power, 
it immediately crowds out the bubble in order to appropriate its value. This policy 
reaction hurts ROW residents, since the bubble would not have burst without it. 
In this case, US fiscal policy is a “beggar-thy-neighbour” type of policy. 
 
 
6. Final remarks 
 
In this paper we have provided a joint account of some of the major US 
macroeconomic events of the past decade:  large current account deficits and a 
steadily decline in the net foreign asset position; the large boom and subsequent 
crash in the stock market; and the emergence of large fiscal deficits.  According 
to the conventional view, the evolution of the stock market and fiscal deficits are 
more or less unrelated events, with the former driven by sharp swings in US 
productivity, and the latter by shifting US political considerations.  Both of these 
in turn fuelled current account deficits that must eventually be reversed as the 
accumulation of public debt becomes excessive. 
 
We instead propose two alternative views in which the stock market and 
the fiscal deficits are closely linked.  Central to our account is the notion that the 
US economy contains “pockets” of inefficiency.  This opens the possibility for 
asset bubbles to exist, which in turn provides a more plausible explanation for 
the large swings in equity values over the past decade.  The appearance of a 
bubble in the US stock market in the second half of the 1990s accounts for much 
of the decline in US net foreign assets during this period.  At the same time, the 
bubble raised welfare worldwide by eliminating inefficient investments.  
According to the “benevolent” view, the collapse of the stock market in 2000 was 
the result of a coordination failure or change in investor sentiment, and the rapid 
expansion of public debt since then served to displace inefficient investments in 
the same way that the bubble did.  Viewed in this light, the large budget deficits  39 
of the Bush administration can be interpreted as a welfare-improving response to 
this market failure.  But there is also a more “cynical” interpretation, that is 
observationally equivalent to the “benevolent” view.  Under this interpretation the 
expansion in public debt caused the collapse of the bubble, as the US 
government tried to appropriate the value of the bubble from its US and foreign 
owners.   
 
To explore these ideas, we have used a minimalist model that puts a 
large weight on theoretical clarity even at the cost of leaving out many important 
aspects of reality. The advantage of this approach is that, by clearly exposing 
the main mechanisms at work, it provides a simple framework to think about the 
interactions between stock market bubbles, budget deficits and the current 
account. This framework has been used to provide a qualitative account of the 
recent US macroeconomic experience. But this can only be seen as a first step 
towards a fuller understanding of this period. The natural next step is to use the 
framework presented here to provide a quantitative account of the recent US 
macroeconomic experience. This will no doubt require enriching the theory by 
bringing back some of those important aspects of reality that have been left out 
here.  40 
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Figure 1:  US Current Account and Net Foreign Assets 
 
 
Source:  Current account data are from US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  NFA data are from 
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Source:  Gourinchas and Rey (2005).  Change in value of equity estimated as 
sum over all quarters of difference between quarterly change in stocks and and 




Figure 3:  Stock Market Boom of the 1990s 
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Figure 4:  Budget Deficits and Interest Rates 
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Figure 5:  Interest Rates and Growth Rates 
 
 
Source: GDP growth is from US Bureau of Economic Analysis and interest rates are 
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Figure 6:  Debt Dynamics in the Benevolent View 
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